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Abstract
For single-commodity networks, the increase of the price of anarchy is bounded by a factor
of (1+ ε)p from above, when the travel demand is increased by a factor of 1+ ε and the latency
functions are polynomials of degree at most p. We show that the same upper bound holds for
multi-commodity networks and provide a lower bound as well.
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1 Introduction and Notation
We study Wardrop’s traffic equilibria (Wardrop, 1952) and how the price of anarchy changes with
demand increases. Wardrop’s traffic equilibria is an example of nonatomic congestion games.
Nonatomic games (Schmeidler, 1973) involve a continuum of players and congestion games (Rosenthal,
1973) are a class of noncooperative Nash games where the utility of each player is a function of
the number of total players who choose the same or overlapping strategies. The price of anarchy
measures the inefficiency of equilibria (Koutsoupias and Papadimitriou, 1999; Papadimitriou, 2001)
by comparing the worst-case social cost of equilibria to the social cost of the system optimal solu-
tion. The price of anarchy for nonatomic congestion games have been well studied in the literature
(Roughgarden and Tardos, 2002; Roughgarden, 2005; Correa et al., 2008).
For single-commodity networks, Englert et al. (2010) have provided the upper bound on the
change of the price of anarchy when the demand increases. A commodity is the travel demand for
an origin-destination (O-D) pair and we assume that there is only one commodity for each O-D
pair. In this paper, we show that the same upper bound is also valid for multi-commodity networks.
We also provide a lower bound on the change of the price of anarchy when the demand increases
for multi-commodity networks. We utilize a classical sensitivity analysis approach, which has not
been well recognized in the price of anarchy literature. By making connections between classical
and modern approaches, we derive both upper and lower bounds on the changes of the price of
anarchy, which were not straightforward using the methods available in the literature.
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2 Preliminaries
For a given directed graph G = (V,E), we consider non-decreasing latency functions ℓe : R≥0 7→ R≥0
for each edge e ∈ E. For each commodity i ∈ [k] = {1, 2, ..., k}, the flow demand is di. We let
Pi denote the available paths for commodity i and P = ∪i∈[k]Pi. Note that Pi ∩ Pj = ∅ for any
commodities i 6= j. Let (G, (di), ℓ) denote an instance of Wardrop equilibrium problems.
A feasible path flow vector f is feasible when
∑
P∈Pi
fP = di for all i ∈ [k] and fp ≥ 0
for all p ∈ P. A path flow vector f can also be written for each edge e, such that fe =∑
i∈[k]
∑
P∈Pi:e∈P
fP . The path latency is defined as ℓP (f) =
∑
e∈P ℓe(fe). The total cost is
defined as C(f) =
∑
P∈P ℓP (f)fP =
∑
e∈E ℓe(fe)fe. An optimal flow f minimizes C(f).
For each commodity i ∈ [k], we define
µi(f) = min
P∈Pi
ℓP (fP ).
We consider the latency function for each edge e ∈ E of the following form:
ℓe(fe) =
p∑
m=0
bemf
m
e
for constants bem ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E and m = 0, 1, ..., p.
Definition 1. A feasible flow vector f is at Wardrop equilibrium if
fP > 0 =⇒ ℓP (f) = µi(f)
for all P ∈ Pi and i ∈ [k].
It is well-known (Smith, 1979; Dafermos, 1980) that at any equilibrium flow f for instance
(G, (di), ℓ), we have ∑
e∈E
ℓe(fe)(f e − fe) ≥ 0 (1)
for all feasible f for instance (G, (di), ℓ).
Considering the demand increase, Roughgarden (2005) derived the following bound for general
non-decreasing latency functions:
Theorem 1 (Roughgarden, 2005). Let ℓe(·) be a non-decreasing function for all e ∈ E. Let C
′
opt be
the cost of an optimal flow for instance (G, ((1 + ε)di), ℓ) and let f be equilibrium flow for instance
(G, (di), ℓ).
C(f) ≤
1
ε
C ′opt. (2)
If we assume polynomial functions for the latency, we can improve the bound in Theorem 1
using the following lemma:
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Lemma 1 (Christodoulou et al., 2011). Let ℓe(·) be a polynomial with nonnegative coefficients of
degree p for all e ∈ E. The inequality
ℓe(fe)f
′
e ≤
p
(p+ 1)1+1/p
ℓe(fe)fe + ℓe(f
′
e)f
′
e
holds for any fe ≥ 0 and f
′
e ≥ 0 for all e ∈ E.
The improved bound follows:
Theorem 2. Let C ′opt be the cost of an optimal flow for instance (G, ((1 + ε)di), ℓ) and let f be
equilibrium flow for instance (G, (di), ℓ). For both instances, suppose polynomial latency functions
of degree at most p with nonnegative coefficients. We have
C(f) ≤
[
(1 + ε)−
p
(p+ 1)1+1/p
]−1
C ′opt. (3)
for all ε ≥ 0.
Proof. For any feasible f̂ for instance (G, ((1 + ε)di), ℓ), we let f =
f̂
1+ε so that f is feasible for
instance (G, (di), ℓ). From (1), we have∑
e∈E
ℓe(fe)fe ≤
1
(1 + ε)
∑
e∈E
ℓe(fe)f̂e.
The right-hand-side can be bounded using Lemma 1 as follows:∑
e∈E
ℓe(fe)f̂e ≤
p
(p + 1)1+1/p
∑
e∈E
ℓe(fe)fe +
∑
e∈E
ℓe(f̂e)f̂e
Therefore, we have (
1−
p
(p+1)1+1/p
(1 + ε)
)∑
e∈E
ℓe(fe)fe ≤
1
(1 + ε)
∑
e∈E
ℓe(f̂e)f̂e
and consequently
C(f) ≤
1
(1 + ε)− p
(p+1)1+1/p
C(f̂).
Since p
(p+1)1+1/p
< 1 for all p ≥ 0, Theorem 2 certainly improves Theorem 1 by considering a
specific form of latency functions. Note that we obtain Theorem 2 by comparing an equilibrium
flow with any feasible flow. Using the following result, however, we will compare the performances
of equilibrium flows and obtain a tighter bound.
3
0.0 0.2 0.4 0.6 0.8 1.0
ε
2
4
6
8
10
B
o
u
n
d
1
ε
p = 4
p = 3
p = 2
p = 1
1
1 + ε
Figure 1: 1ε from Theorem 1; p = 1, 2, 3, 4 from Theorem 2; and
1
1+ε from Theorem 5
Theorem 3 (Dafermos and Nagurney, 1984). Let ℓe(·) be a non-decreasing function for all e ∈ E.
Let f and f ′ be equilibrium flows for instances (G, (di), ℓ) and (G, ((1+ ε)di), ℓ), respectively. Then
the following inequality holds: ∑
i∈[k]
(µi(f
′)− µi(f))(d
′
i − di) ≥ 0 (4)
where d′i = (1 + ε)di.
Theorem 3 shows that the minimum path latency function µi(·) exhibits the characteristics of
monotone functions with respect to the travel demand changes. In Theorem 5, we show that the
ratio between the performances of equilibrium flows is bounded by 11+ε . See Figure 1 for comparison.
3 Changes of the Price of Anarchy
We consider the demand changes from di to (1 + ε)di for all commodity i ∈ [k] for some ε ≥ 0. We
first compare the performances of system optimum flows in the two instances.
Theorem 4. Let Copt and C
′
opt be the cost of an optimal flow for instances (G, (di), ℓ) and
(G, ((1 + ε)di), ℓ) with polynomial latency functions of degree at most p with nonnegative coeffi-
cients, respectively. Then we can show
(1 + ε)Copt ≤ C
′
opt ≤ (1 + ε)
p+1Copt. (5)
4
Proof. We let f ′∗ be the optimal flow for instance (G, ((1 + ε)di), ℓ) and f̂ =
f ′∗
1+ε . Then,
C ′opt =
∑
e∈E
ℓe((1 + ε)f̂e)(1 + ε)f̂e
= (1 + ε)
∑
e∈E
ℓe((1 + ε)f̂e)f̂e
≥ (1 + ε)
∑
e∈E
ℓe(f̂e)f̂e
≥ (1 + ε)Copt.
Also, we let f∗ be the optimal flow for instance (G, (di), ℓ) and then (1+ ε)f
∗ is feasible to instance
(G, ((1 + ε)di), ℓ). We have
C ′opt ≤
∑
e∈E
ℓe((1 + ε)f
∗
e )(1 + ε)f
∗
e
=
∑
e∈E
( p∑
m=0
bem((1 + ε)f
∗
e )
m
)
(1 + ε)f∗e
≤
∑
e∈E
( p∑
m=0
bem(1 + ε)
p(f∗e )
m
)
(1 + ε)f∗e
= (1 + ε)p+1
∑
e∈E
ℓe(f
∗
e )f
∗
e
= (1 + ε)p+1Copt.
Next, we compare the performances of equilibrium flows in the two instances. Although Theo-
rem 3 of Englert et al. (2010) considers single-commodity networks and focuses on path latency, the
same technique is valid for showing the following theorem for multi-commodity networks. While the
bound on the path latency does not hold in multi-commodity networks as noted by Englert et al.
(2010), it still provides a bound on the total cost. Using Theorem 3, we can also provide a lower
bound.
Theorem 5. Let f and f ′ be equilibrium flows for instances (G, (di), ℓ) and (G, ((1 + ε)di), ℓ) with
polynomial latency functions of degree at most p with nonnegative coefficients, respectively. Then
we can show
(1 + ε)C(f) ≤ C(f ′) ≤ (1 + ε)p+1C(f). (6)
Proof. By Theorem 3, we have
0 ≤
∑
i∈[k]
(µi(f
′)− µi(f))((1 + ε)di − di)
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= ε
∑
i∈[k]
(µi(f
′)− µi(f))di
=
ε
1 + ε
∑
i∈[k]
µi(f
′)(1 + ε)di − ε
∑
i∈[k]
µi(f)di
=
ε
1 + ε
∑
i∈[k]
µi(f
′)d′i − ε
∑
i∈[k]
µi(f)di
=
ε
1 + ε
C(f ′)− εC(f),
which leads to (1 + ε)C(f) ≤ C(f ′).
The upper bound, C(f ′) ≤ (1 + ε)p+1C(f), is already proved by the proof of Theorem 3 in
Englert et al. (2010).
In Theorems 4 and 5, both lower and upper bounds are tight. The lower bound happens when
the latency functions are constant in all edges. The upper bound happens when the latency function
is a monomial of degree p in a single-edge network with a single commodity.
For any p ≥ 0, we have
1
(1 + ε)
≤
1
(1 + ε)− p
(p+1)1+1/p
<
1
ε
.
Therefore the bound in Theorem 5 is tighter than the bounds in Theorems 1 and 2, as seen in
Figure 1.
When the demand increases, from Theorems 4 and 5, we can observe that the cost of both the
optimal flow and the equilibrium flow increases at least by factor of 1 + ε. We obtain both lower
and upper bounds on the change of price of anarchy as follows:
Theorem 6. Let ρ and ρ′ denote the Price of Anarchy (PoA) for instances (G, (di), ℓ) and (G, ((1+
ε)di), ℓ) with polynomial latency functions of degree at most p with nonnegative coefficients, respec-
tively. Then 1(1+ε)p ≤
ρ′
ρ ≤ (1 + ε)
p.
Proof. We can show that
ρ′
ρ
=
C(f ′)/C ′opt
C(f)/Copt
=
C(f ′)
C(f)
·
Copt
C ′opt
≤ (1 + ε)p+1 ·
1
1 + ε
= (1 + ε)p
where the inequality holds by Theorem 4. Similarly,
ρ
ρ′
=
C(f)/Copt
C(f ′)/C ′opt
=
C(f)
C(f ′)
·
C ′opt
Copt
≤
1
1 + ε
· (1 + ε)p+1 = (1 + ε)p
The upper bound is identical to the result of Englert et al. (2010), but holds for multi-commodity
networks. O’Hare et al. (2016) study how the price of anarchy may decay as the demand increases.
When the price of anarchy decreases, the lower bound in Theorem 6 provides useful information.
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Figure 2: An example (Englert et al., 2010) with two commodities: from s to t1 and from s to t2
4 Examples and Insights
Consider an example in Figure 2, originally considered in Englert et al. (2010). The edge latency
function ℓe(x) is written on each edge as a function of edge flow x. There are two commodities with
demand d1 = 1 and d2 = k for constant k ≥ 1. Suppose we increase the travel demand by factor
(1+ ε) for both commodities. At the equilibrium, the path latency for d1 increases from 1 to 1+kε
and the path latency for d2 increases from k
2 to k2 + kε; by a multiplicative factor of (1 + kε) and
(1 + εk ), respectively. For d1, the multiplicative increase factor exceeds the bound (1 + ε)
p, while it
is below the bound for d2. Although the increase in the travel demand for commodities is uniform,
the increase in the resulting path latency is not.
The total cost, however, is still bounded as indicated in Theorem 5. Before the increase, the total
cost at the equilibrium is C(f) = 1+k3, while after the increase, it is C(f ′) = (1+ε)(1+2kε+k3).
Since k ≥ 1, it is easy to show that the ratio C(f ′)/C(f) is bounded below and above as follows:
(1 + ε) ≤
(1 + ε)(1 + 2kε + k3)
1 + k3
≤ (1 + ε)2.
Note that when k = 1, the ratio is equal to the upper bound. The lower bound becomes tight only
when ε = 0. It is easy to see, however, that the lower bound in Theorem 5 becomes tight when all
edge latency functions are constant functions.
We can obtain an insight from this example for the upper bound. At the equilibrium f , the
total cost is the sum of the path latency, weighted by the travel demand:
C(f) =
∑
i∈[k]
µi(f)di.
Since the increase in C(f) is bounded, an over-increase in the path latency for a certain commodity
is alleviated by under-increases in the path latency for other commodities. Those commodities
with under-increases likely have more total travel demands than those with over-increases. In
the example in Figure 2, d1 = 1 and d2 = k with k ≥ 1; therefore the travel demand for the
second commodity with under-increase in the path latency exceeds the travel demand for the first
commodity with over-increase.
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Figure 3: Nonlinear Pigou Example (Roughgarden, 2005)
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Figure 4: Price of Anarchy decreases as ε increases in the nonlinear Pigou example
We consider the nonlinear Pigou example in Figure 3, which consists of a single commodity
from s to t through two edges. In this example, the PoA decreases as ε increases. When the travel
demand is 1, the PoA is at its upper bound, ρ = (p+1)
(1+1/p)
(p+1)(1+1/p)−p
. If the travel demand increases to
1 + ε, then the total cost at equilibrium is 1 + ε and the optimal total cost is 1 + ε− p1+p
(
1
1+p
)1/p
.
Therefore, the PoA becomes
ρ′ =
1 + ε
1 + ε− p1+p
(
1
1+p
)1/p = [1− 11 + ε p1 + p( 11 + p)1/p
]−1
,
which monotonically decreases as ε increases. In Figure 4, ρ′/ρ is compared with the lower bound
in Theorem 6.
We test the Sioux Falls network for a single commodity following O’Hare et al. (2016). The
Sioux Falls network, shown in Figure 5, has been popularly used in transportation research and
the dataset is available online (Transportation Networks for Research Core Team, 2019). The edge
latency functions are polynomials of order p = 4. We choose a single commodity from node 20 to
node 3 and set the initial travel demand as 1,000. Then we increase the demand by 10% each time
by multiplying (1 + ε) with ε = 0.1. We repeat 50 times. We compute both Wardrop equilibrium
and system optimal flows. The resulting price of anarchy (PoA) is presented in Figure 6a. As the
travel demand increases, PoA tends to increase and then decrease, but not monotonically. There
are several up-and-down points. In each travel demand increase, the ratio between two PoA values,
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Figure 5: Sioux Falls Network with 24 nodes, 76 edges, and 528 commodities
namely ρ′/ρ as in Theorem 6 is computed and presented in Figure 6b. While the ratio is bounded
between (1 + ε)−4 = 0.683 and (1 + ε)4 = 1.464 as given in Theorem 6, the ratios remain near 1.0
mostly.
In the original dataset of the Sioux Falls network, there are 528 commodities with non-zero
travel demand. In this time, we consider all 528 commodities. We set the initial travel demand as
5% of the original travel demand given in the dataset and then start increasing demands by factor
of (1 + ε) with ε = 0.1. We repeat this process 40 times. The results are presented in Figure 7.
Similar observations can be made for both single-commodity and 528-commodity cases.
To observe the effect of ε on the PoA ratio, we present the PoA ratio ρ
′
ρ for various ε values for
single-commodity and 528-commodity Sioux Falls network in Figure 8. For the single OD pair Sioux
Falls network, we set the initial demand to 3000 units. For the full Sioux Falls network, we set the
initial demand to the original travel demand. As presented in Figure 8a, for the single commodity
network, the PoA ratio is not monotone and it has a breakpoint. The PoA ratio initially increases
with ε with an increasing rate until the breakpoint, after which it decreases with a decreasing rate
up to a local minimum point and then increases again. For the full Sioux Falls network, shown in
Figure 8b, the PoA ratio decreases with a non-increasing rate.
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Figure 6: Price of Anarchy in Sioux Falls network with single commodity
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Figure 7: Price of Anarchy in Sioux Falls network with 528 commodities
10
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00
ε
1.000
1.005
1.010
1.015
1.020
1.025 ρ′
ρ
(a) Sioux Falls network with single commodity
0.00 0.25 0.50 0.75 1.00 1.25 1.50 1.75 2.00
ε
0.960
0.965
0.970
0.975
0.980
0.985
0.990
0.995
1.000
ρ′
ρ
(b) Sioux Falls network with 528 commodities
Figure 8: PoA ratio for different ε values for Sioux Falls network
5 Discussion on the Non-tightness of the Bounds
In the examples, we observe that the bounds in Theorem 6 are not tight. Indeed, it cannot be tight
for large ε. Clearly, the PoA ρ is bounded as follows (Roughgarden, 2005):
1 ≤ ρ ≤
(p + 1)(1+1/p)
(p+ 1)(1+1/p) − p
and so is ρ′. Therefore,
(p+ 1)(1+1/p) − p
(p+ 1)(1+1/p)
≤
ρ′
ρ
≤
(p+ 1)(1+1/p)
(p + 1)(1+1/p) − p
also holds regardless ε. This indicates that the bounds in Theorem 6 will never be tight for large
ε such that
ε ≥
[
(p+ 1)(1+1/p)
(p + 1)(1+1/p) − p
] 1
p
− 1. (7)
This effective ε is plotted in Figure 9.
Figure 10 represents the PoA ratio, theoretical bound (1+ε)p and the clear bound (p+1)
(1+1/p)
(p+1)(1+1/p)−p
based on Roughgarden (2005) for different ε values for single commodity and full Sioux Falls network
(p = 4). As Figure 10a and 10b represent the PoA ratio is always less than the theoretical bounds.
The two values, (1+ε)p and (p+1)
(1+1/p)
(p+1)(1+1/p)−p
, become the same at about ε ≈ 0.2110. When ε < 0.2110,
(1 + ε)p is smaller compare to (p+1)
(1+1/p)
(p+1)(1+1/p)−p
; for larger ε values, it is greater than (p+1)
(1+1/p)
(p+1)(1+1/p)−p
.
Hence, the obtained bound (1 + ε)p can be tight only for small ε values.
In general, we make a series of observations to see how hard it is to achieve the bounds in
Theorem 6, while we do not make definitive conclusion. First, we obtain the following two lemmas
regarding the upper bound in Theorem 6. Note that the upper bound is obtained only if C ′opt =
11
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Figure 9: The maximum ε effective for the bounds in Theorem 6, as given in (7)
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Figure 10: Comparing PoA ratio and theoretical bounds for different ε values for Sioux Falls
network (p = 4).
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(1 + ε)Copt and C(f
′) = (1 + ε)p+1C(f).
Lemma 2. Let Copt and C
′
opt be the cost of an optimal flow for instances (G, (di), ℓ) and (G, ((1+
ε)di), ℓ) with polynomial latency functions of degree at most p with nonnegative coefficients, re-
spectively. Let f∗ and f
′∗ be the optimal flows for instances (G, (di), ℓ) and (G, ((1 + ε)di), ℓ),
respectively. Suppose C ′opt = (1 + ε)Copt. Then, there exist edges with constant latency functions;
in particular those edges e ∈ E with f
′∗
e > 0.
Proof. We let f ′∗ be the optimal flow for instance (G, ((1 + ε)di), ℓ) and f̂ =
f ′∗
1+ε . Then, from (i),
we have
(1 + ε)Copt = C
′
opt =
∑
e∈E
ℓe((1 + ε)f̂e)(1 + ε)f̂e
= (1 + ε)
∑
e∈E
ℓe((1 + ε)f̂e)f̂e
≥ (1 + ε)
∑
e∈E
ℓe(f̂e)f̂e
≥ (1 + ε)Copt.
Therefore, we must have ∑
e∈E
ℓe((1 + ε)f̂e)f̂e =
∑
e∈E
ℓe(f̂e)f̂e.
Consequently, ∑
e∈E
[ℓe((1 + ε)f̂e)− ℓe(f̂e)]f̂e = 0
Since ℓe(·) is monotone, we have
f̂e > 0 =⇒ ℓe((1 + ε)f̂e) = ℓe(f̂e)
for any e ∈ E. Therefore, ℓe(·) is constant on [f̂e, (1+ε)f̂e] for any e ∈ E such that f̂e > 0. Since we
consider polynomial latency functions, we conclude that there exist constant latency functions.
Lemma 3. Let f and f ′ be equilibrium flows for instances (G, (di), ℓ) and (G, ((1 + ε)di), ℓ) with
polynomial latency functions of degree at most p with nonnegative coefficients, respectively. Suppose
C(f ′) = (1 + ε)p+1C(f). Then, on all edge e ∈ E with fe > 0 or f
′
e > 0, the latency function ℓe(·)
is of order p.
Proof. Adopting the approach used in Theorem 3 of Englert et al. (2010), we consider monic mono-
mial latency functions only: ℓe(fe) = f
pe
e for each e ∈ E. It is well known that equilibrium flows f
and f ′ minimize the potential function
Φ(x) =
∑
e∈E
∫ xe
0
ℓe(u) du
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on their respective feasible set. Therefore, we have Φ(f) ≤ Φ(f ′/(1 + ε)) and Φ(f ′) ≤ Φ((1 + ε)f),
which can be written as follows:
(1 + ε)p+1
∑
e∈E
1
pe + 1
fpe+1e ≤
∑
e∈E
(1 + ε)p−pe
pe + 1
f
′pe+1
e , (8)
∑
e∈E
1
pe + 1
f
′pe+1
e ≤
∑
e∈E
(1 + ε)pe+1
pe + 1
fpe+1e . (9)
The condition C(f ′) = (1 + ε)p+1C(f) can be written as follows:
(1 + ε)p+1
∑
e∈E
fpe+1e =
∑
e∈E
f
′pe+1
e . (10)
We can express p · (8) + ((p+ 1)(1 + ε)p − 1) · (9) + ((1 + ε)p − 1) · (10) as follows:∑
e∈E
cef
pe+1
e ≤
∑
e∈E
c′ef
′pe+1
e (11)
where
ce = p ·
(1 + ε)p+1
pe + 1
− ((p + 1)(1 + ε)p − 1) ·
(1 + ε)pe+1
pe + 1
+ ((1 + ε)p − 1) · (1 + ε)p+1
c′e = p ·
(1 + ε)p−pe
pe + 1
− ((p + 1)(1 + ε)p − 1) ·
1
pe + 1
+ ((1 + ε)p − 1)
Englert et al. (2010) show that ce ≥ 0 and c
′
e ≤ 0 for all e ∈ E. Therefore, for (11) to hold, we
must have the following condition for all e ∈ E: if either fe or f
′
e is nonzero, then ce = c
′
e = 0. It
is easy to see that ce = c
′
e = 0 implies pe = p.
Lemma 2 claims that the path latency function ℓP (·) along any actively used path used by the
optimal flow f
′∗ must be a constant function. Lemma 3, on the other hand, indicates that ℓP (·)
along any path used by equilibrium flow either f or f ′ must be polynomials of order p. Therefore,
if the upper bound in Theorem 6 is obtained, then we must have fe = f
′
e = 0 on any edge used by
f
′∗.
We make similar observations regarding the lower bound (1 + ε)−p.
Lemma 4. Let Copt and C
′
opt be the cost of an optimal flow for instances (G, (di), ℓ) and (G, ((1+
ε)di), ℓ) with polynomial latency functions of degree at most p with nonnegative coefficients, re-
spectively. Let f∗ and f
′∗ be the optimal flows for instances (G, (di), ℓ) and (G, ((1 + ε)di), ℓ),
respectively. Suppose C ′opt = (1 + ε)
p+1Copt. Then, on all edge e ∈ E with f
∗
e > 0, the latency
function ℓe(·) is of order p.
Proof. We let f∗ be the optimal flow for instance (G, (di), ℓ) and then (1+ε)f
∗ is feasible to instance
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(G, ((1 + ε)di), ℓ). From (i), we have
(1 + ε)p+1Copt = C
′
opt ≤
∑
e∈E
ℓe((1 + ε)f
∗
e )(1 + ε)f
∗
e
=
∑
e∈E
( p∑
m=0
bem((1 + ε)f
∗
e )
m
)
(1 + ε)f∗e
≤
∑
e∈E
( p∑
m=0
bem(1 + ε)
p(f∗e )
m
)
(1 + ε)f∗e
= (1 + ε)p+1
∑
e∈E
ℓe(f
∗
e )f
∗
e
= (1 + ε)p+1Copt,
where all inequalities must hold as equalities. From the second inequality, we must have
∑
e∈E
( p∑
m=0
bem
[
(1 + ε)p(f∗e )
m − ((1 + ε)f∗e )
m
])
(1 + ε)f∗e = 0.
For any e ∈ E, if f∗e > 0, then we observe that bem = 0 for m 6= p, which implies that ℓe(·) is a
monomial of order p. From the first inequality, we also obtain f
′∗
e = (1 + ε)f
∗
e for all e ∈ E.
Lemma 5. Let f and f ′ be equilibrium flows for instances (G, (di), ℓ) and (G, ((1 + ε)di), ℓ) with
polynomial latency functions of degree at most p with nonnegative coefficients, respectively. Suppose
C(f ′) = (1 + ε)C(f). Then, on all edge e ∈ E with f ′e 6= fe, the latency functions ℓe(·) is constant.
Proof. The bound C(f ′) = (1 + ε)C(f) is based on Theorem 3, which is derived from the mono-
tonicity of latency functions; that is,∑
e∈E
[ℓe(f
1
e )− ℓe(f
2
e )](f
1
e − f
2
e ) ≥ 0
for any f1, f2 ≥ 0. If C(f ′) = (1 + ε)C(f) holds, then, by backtracking the proof of Theorem 3,
given in Dafermos and Nagurney (1984), we can easily show that∑
e∈E
[ℓe(f
′)− ℓe(f)](f
′
e − fe) = 0.
Since ℓe(·) is monotone, we must have [ℓe(f
′)− ℓe(f)](f
′
e − fe) = 0 for each e ∈ E. If f
′
e 6= fe, then
we must have ℓe(f
′
e) = ℓe(fe), which implies that ℓe(·) is a constant function. There must exist
edges with f ′e 6= fe; otherwise, either f
′ or f is infeasible.
Lemma 4 states that the latency functions are of order p on all paths used by f∗. Lemma 5
indicates that the latency functions are constant on edges with f ′e 6= fe. Therefore, if the lower
bound in Theorem 6 is obtained, then we must have f ′e = fe on any edge used by f
∗.
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